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1 Introduction
German Reunification marks an example of comprehensive economic integration of two
formerly separated regions into a single economic entity. What has been particularly strik-
ing is the massive movement of production factors in opposite directions. East Germany
has received enormous capital inflows, whereas low wages and high unemployment rates
has been responsible for large East German labor force outmigration. Beyond that, Eastern
wages were set above labor productivity levels, particularly during the first decade after
unification, which may have distorted private capital investment incentives and delayed
productivity convergence between both German regions (e.g. Akerlof et al., 1991; Sinn and
Sinn, 1992). Moreover, the high-wage policy increased Eastern unemployment rates, which
in turn increased migration incentives further and initiated large public social transfers to
East German households (Sinn, 2000).
The first aim of this paper is to evaluate the potential of a neoclassical growth model
with capital and labor mobility to explain major empirical trends of the German integration
episode between 1991 and 2012. I therefore set up a benchmark model which accounts for
capital and labor movements in opposite directions and compare the model’s predictions
with the empirical time series for relative East-West-German labor productivity conver-
gence, East-German labor force net outmigration, and East-German private gross capital
inflows. The second aim is then to examine the impact of wage-setting behavior and public
social transfers on the macroeconomic development in unified Germany. For this reason, I
extend the model by both policy measures and compare the resulting predictions with the
time series of the three macroeconomic variables and the benchmark model.
Economic integration of two formally separated regions into a single economic entity
may be achieved by several mechanisms.1 In this paper, I exclusively focus on capital
and labor mobility representing the major driving forces behind the German East-West
convergence process (see discussion in the following section). Moreover, I consider adjust-
1 According to Burda and Hunt (2001) economic integration may be achieved by one of the following five
mechanisms or their combination: (i) internal capital accumulation in the capital-poor region, (ii) capital
mobility from the capital-rich to the capital-poor region, (iii) labor mobility from the capital-poor to the
capital-rich region, (iv) Heckscher-Ohlin type trade, and (v) technology adoption by the backward region
from the leading region.
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ment costs of moving both production factors which has been associated with this process
(Burda, 2006, 2008). I neglect, however, technological differences across both regions which
allows me to examine the potential of one particular model which stresses capital and labor
mobility to explain major empirical trends.
The key results of the paper are: First, the fully extended model is able to replicate
aggregate migration pattern in unified Germany. It does, however, not fully match East-
West labor productivity convergence and capital inflows. The former appears to be pre-
determined by the type of the employed model, as a neoclassical model does imply full
convergence by construction. Second, the policy analysis shows that wage-setting behav-
ior has delayed labor productivity convergence between both German regions and would
have increased East-West net migration substantially if government interventions had not
been carried out. Third, public social transfers have been successful in reducing the effect
of wage setting on East-West net migration.
It is important to note, that the derived results are not implied by a standard neoclassi-
cal two-region economy model with two production factors and without frictions. Because
then, only one of the two, labor or capital, would move instantaneously until wages and
capital returns are equalized across both regions. The capital-labor ratio needs to be equal-
ized, and if one factor moves, this equality is reached for a unique allocation of this factor
over the two regions. In this paper, however, I study the case with frictions: both labor
and capital move in opposite directions since each factor moves to the region where it is
scarce, but neither capital nor labor can move instantaneously since factor adjustment costs
are present. In the long-run, capital-labor ratios need to be equalized but this equalization
can happen for multiple levels of these inputs. Hence there is hysteresis, that is the long
run size of each region depends on initial conditions, factor adjustment costs as well as
distortions along the transition path.
The paper complements the theoretical literature on the macroeconomic development
in unified Germany. Most related to this work are Funke and Strulik (2000) as well as Burda
(2006, 2008) who investigate the pattern of German East-West convergence.2 Burda (2006,
2008) emphasizes on the importance of factor mobility and adjustment costs. He proposes
2 Theoretical papers on the pattern of unemployment comprise Snower and Merkl (2006) and Uhlig (2006).
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a centralized open economy model which accounts for factor movements in opposite direc-
tions but he does not evaluate the predictions implied by the model with respect to various
empirical time series. Funke and Strulik (2000) show that government interventions and
wage-setting behavior affect the transition path of the Eastern economy. Their analysis,
however, does not take into account the effects of both policy measures on East-West mi-
gration rates and vice versa. The model in this paper includes migration and reveals the
impact of wage-setting behavior and public social transfers with respect to labor produc-
tivity convergence, net migration rates, and private capital inflows.
There is a sizable literature on the relationship between labor mobility and private cap-
ital formation.3 One strand of the literature emphazises the role of increasing returns to
scale (see e.g. Faini, 1996; Reichlin and Rustichini, 1998; Schäfer and Steger, 2014), which I
do not consider.4 Closest to the framework in this paper is Rappaport (2005), who studies
a neoclassical one-sector economy model with factor mobility and adjustment costs. He
argues that an increase in labor mobility does not necessarily increase the speed of income
convergence. That is, emigration raises, ceteris paribus, the wage in the source region, but
it also reduces the shadow value of capital which slows down private capital investments
and therewith income convergence.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I briefly discuss major empirical trends
of German Reunification. In Section 3, I set up a benchmark model of economic integra-
tion and compare its prediction with the empirical series of three macroeconomic vari-
ables. In Section 4 and 5, I introduce wage-setting behavior and public social transfers,
respectively, and discuss their implications with respect to the model’s prediction. The last
section briefly summarizes the paper and concludes.
2 Empirical stylized facts
Table 1 summarizes important macroeconomic indicators of East-West convergence from
1991 to 2012. As the first two columns reveal, East Germany’s catch up in terms of in-
3 For an extensive literature survey, see Felbermayr et al. (2015).
4 Schäfer and Steger (2014) analyze the dynamics of comprehensive economic integration when fundamentals
and expectations interact in the process of equilibrium selection. Their model is able to replicate limited
income convergence between East and West Germany.
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Real GDP Real Labor Real Wage Unemployment
per Capita Productivity Rate
in ratios of West German levels
1991 0.38 0.40 0.58 1.65
1992 0.43 0.51 0.64 2.25
1993 0.51 0.60 0.68 1.93
1994 0.57 0.64 0.70 1.74
1995 0.60 0.66 0.72 1.63
1996 0.62 0.67 0.72 1.68
1997 0.62 0.69 0.72 1.77
1998 0.62 0.69 0.72 1.86
1999 0.62 0.70 0.73 1.95
2000 0.61 0.70 0.74 2.20
2001 0.61 0.71 0.74 2.35
2002 0.62 0.73 0.75 2.26
2003 0.63 0.73 0.75 2.16
2004 0.64 0.74 0.75 2.14
2005 0.65 0.74 0.76 1.87
2006 0.65 0.74 0.75 1.88
2007 0.65 0.74 0.75 2.01
2008 0.65 0.73 0.76 2.03
2009 0.66 0.75 0.77 1.88
2010 0.66 0.74 0.77 1.81
2011 0.65 0.74 0.77 1.88
2012 0.65 0.75 n.a. 1.80
Table 1: East-West convergence from 1991 to 2012. Wages are adjusted by the private con-
sumption deflator. Berlin is excluded from calculations, except for the unemploy-
ment rate where the state belongs to East Germany. Sources: Statistisches Bunde-
samt (2013b,c,d), Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2013).
come per capita and labor productivity was remarkable during the early 1990s but slowed
down significantly later on. Even though average per capita convergence is still above the
neoclassical prediction by Barro (1991) of 1.5-2 percent per annum, it is not clear today
if East Germany will experience full income convergence at a slow pace or even limited
convergence in the long run.5 In fact, the real GDP per capita gap between East and West
Germany has been closed annually by 2.7 percent on average between 1991 and 2012.
Figure 1 depicts the most striking characteristic of the German integration episode - the
movement of capital and labor in opposite directions. Economic integration paved the way
for the Eastern economy to achieve efficient production patterns and promoted high rates
of private capital investments (panel b). However, the Eastern labor force faced on average
lower wages and higher unemployment rates compared to their Western counterpart (see
5 Uhlig (2006) was among the first to point out the possibility of limited convergence in the long run.
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(a) East-West Net Migration Rates
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(b) East Private Gross Capital Investment Rates
Figure 1: Migration and investment in Eastern Germany. Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt
(2005, 2013a), own calculations.
Table 1), which are accountable for the large net migration outflow each year (panel a).
Until 2011, total net migration amounted to nearly 1.2 million people and was especially
concentrated among the higher educated youth.6
Moreover, German labor unions agreed on a fast wage convergence during the first
decade after unification to prevent mass migration and to protect the western labor force
from low-wage competition (Sinn, 2000). The increase in firms’ production costs led to
massive lay-offs and rising unemployment rates in the East, which in turn raised migra-
tion incentives. Hence, the German government was forced to substantially increase social
security transfers to East German households in the form of unemployment and retire-
ment benefits. Between 1991 and 2010, net public transfers amounted to 70 billion Euros,
or 3 percent of Germany’s GDP, on average per year, whereas about 65 percent consti-
tuted social assistances (Blum et al., 2009; Kloß et al., 2012). Even though private capital
investments in East Germany were stimulated by an extensive investment subsidy law af-
ter unification (Sinn, 2002), the increase in production costs reduced investment incentives.
The high-wage policy acted as a brake on the integration process as emphasized by sev-
eral economists (e.g. Akerlof et al., 1991; Sinn and Sinn, 1992) and may have delayed labor
productivity convergence between both regions.
6 For a disaggregate analysis of East-West migration patterns see e.g. Hunt (2006). Note that typical migration
costs as language or cultural differences do not apply.
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3 The Benchmark Model
Consider a small open economy which comprises a rich region, west, and a poor region,
east, in terms of the initial capital-labor ratio. Both regions are perfectly integrated into
the world capital market and populated by a large number of identical individuals and
firms. The interest rate, r¯ > 0, is exogenously given and domestic savings have no effect
on capital accumulation, which is determined by the investment demand of firms in each
region. In each period t ∈ [0,∞) only interregional migration between east and west is
permitted. Let subscript i ∈ {E,W} on a variable index region. Then, given a continuum
of mass Ni of individuals in both regions and denoting M(t) as net migration from east to
west, total population size in region i at time t is given by initial population and migration
until period t:
NW (t) = NW (0) +
∫ t
0
M(s)ds (1)
NE(t) = NE(0)−
∫ t
0
M(s)ds. (2)
Differentiating (1) and (2) with respect to time yields
N˙W (t) = −N˙E(t) = M(t), (3)
where M(t) > 0 implies net migration from east to west. A dot on a variable denotes its
derivative with respect to time. Overall population P in the economy is assumed to be
constant, so that P = NW +NE holds in each period.
3.1 Firms
There is mass one of identical firms in both regions operating in a perfectly competitive
environment. Each firm employs a constant-returns-to-scale production technology that
combines capital and labor, K and L, to produce a single homogeneous good that can
be used either for consumption or investment. Firms own their capital stock. Aggregate
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output Yi(t) and the evolution of capital in both regions at time t are given by
Yi(t) = Ki(t)
αLi(t)
1−α, 0 < α < 1, (4)
K˙i(t) = Ii(t)− δKi(t), i = E,W, (5)
where Ii denotes gross capital investment in region i and δ ≥ 0 is the constant capital
depreciation rate.7 According to Abel (1982) and Hayashi (1982), capital investments are
assumed to be subject to convex adjustment costs. The representative firm in each region
chooses paths for investment Ii(t) and labor Li(t), so as to maximize the present value of
its net cash flow subject to the law of motion for capital:
max
Li,Ii
∫ ∞
0
{
Kαi L
1−α
i − wiLi − Ii
[
1 +
γK
2
(
Ii
Ki
)]}
e−r¯tdt (6)
s.t. K˙i = Ii − δKi (7)
Ki(0) = Ki0 given, Li(0) = Li0 given, i = E,W.
where γK > 0 measures the capital adjustment costs intensity. The first-order conditions
together with (5) yield
wi = (1− α)
(
Ki
Li
)α
, (8)
K˙i =
(
qi − 1
γK
− δ
)
Ki, (9)
q˙i = (r¯ + δ) qi − α
(
Ki
Li
)α−1
− (qi − 1)
2
2γK
, (10)
where qi denotes the shadow value of capital in region i.8 The firms’ inverse demand for
labor is given by equation (8), while the evolution of the capital stock is governed by equa-
tion (9) and (10). The latter equation describes the arbitrage condition of capital which
equates the return of an additional unit installed to its respective opportunity costs. Pos-
7 McAdam and Willman (2004) estimated an elasticity of substitution for Germany of 0.7 in the pre-
reunification period and of 1.1 in the post-reunification period. For both periods, their estimation does
not reject the hypothesis of unit elasticity of substitution implied by the Cobb-Douglas production function.
8 Derivations are relegated to the appendix and the time index t is suppressed whenever no ambiguity arises.
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itive values of the adjustment cost parameter, γK , reduce the rate of capital accumulation
and affect the long run capital endowment in both regions.
3.2 Individuals
Individuals in both regions supply one unit of labor inelastically to the labor market and
choose the consumption path, ci(t), that maximizes their utility subject to their budget con-
straint. Initial conditions are assumed to imply an east-west wage differential, giving rise
to migration incentives. Thus, individuals do not only choose their optimal consumption
path but also their location. The optimization problem of a representative individual in
both regions is summarized by
max
ci(s)
Ui(t) =
∫ ∞
t
ci(s)
1−σ − 1
1− σ e
−ρ[s−t]ds (11)
s.t.
∫ ∞
t
e−r¯[s−t]ci(s)ds = Vi(t) (12)
ai(t) = ait given, i = E,W,
where ρ > 0 denotes the time-preference rate, σ > 0 the inverse of the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution and Vi(t) denotes individual wealth, which comprises initial financial
wealth ai(t) and human wealth
∫∞
t e
−r¯[s−t]wi(s)ds. More specifically, individual wealth of
an agent of region i is given by
Vi(t) =

ai(t) +
∫ ∞
t
e−r¯[s−t]wi(s)ds if the agent does not migrate
ai(t) +
∫ ∞
t
e−r¯[s−t]wj(s)ds−mci if the agent migrates in period t
, (13)
with i, j ∈ {E,W} and i 6= j. Following Braun (1993), interregional migration is subject
to migration costs mci, which accrue in terms of consumable goods by the migrant at the
period of leaving his region. These costs are assumed to be an increasing function in the
number of migrantsM(t) of the same period and therefore depend on the flow of migrants
and not on the stock of formerly migrated individuals.9 The relation reflects transaction
9 In comparison to international migration pattern, there is no evidence for migration-cost reducing network
effects in the case of German East-West migration.
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costs in the process of moving, for instance, increasing transportation costs or agent’s com-
mission for housing in the host region.10 Migration costs are explicitly given by
mci = γLM(t), i = E,W, (14)
where γL > 0 denotes the migration cost intensity parameter.
Now, the important point to notice is that, in equilibrium, individual wealth does not
change in response to migration. The reason is that, in equilibrium, the gain in terms of
human wealth, due to prevailing east-west wage differentials, equals the migration costs,
as explained below. This feature of the model allows to separate consumption decisions
from migration decisions, which makes the analysis tractable.
3.3 Migration
A well know property of the individuals optimization problem stated above is that, the
individual consumption path is proportional to individual wealth according to11
ci(t) =

ρ
(
ai(t) +
∫ ∞
t
e−r¯[s−t]wi(s)ds
)
if the agent does not migrate
ρ
(
ai(t) +
∫ ∞
t
e−r¯[s−t]wj(s)ds−mci
)
if the agent migrates in period t
, (15)
with i, j ∈ {E,W} and i 6= j. Substituting both expressions into the utility function in (11),
one obtains the indirect utilities of a migrant and non-migrant, respectively. However, note
that the only difference is given by the present value labor income differential. Then, the
analysis can be simplified in the following way. Let λj(t) denote the migration benefit of a
migrant from the source region i at time t, such that
λj(t) =
∫ ∞
t
[wj(s)− wi(s)] e−r¯[s−t]ds, i, j ∈ {E,W}, i 6= j. (16)
An individual of region i is willing to migrate in period t if and only if his migration benefit
is positive and exceeds migration cost. Moreover, (16) implies λi(t) = −λj(t), which means
10 The proposed type of cost function may also be interpret as social costs in form of public opposition in the
host region against massive immigration.
11 See, for example, Barro and Sala-i Martin (2004).
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that migration takes place only in one direction. In a competitive equilibrium cost must
equal benefit, λj(t) = mci, so that individual wealth Vi(t) does not change in response
to migration and both, migrant and non-migrant, choose an identical consumption path.
The optimal consumption path that solves the optimization problem of the representative
individual above implies a consumption growth rate of:
c˙i(t)
ci(t)
=
1
σ
(r¯ − ρ) , i = E,W. (17)
However, the knife-edge condition of the model requires r¯ = ρ, so that consumption does
not grow.12
Wages are assumed to be initially lower in the eastern region, implying a positive mi-
gration benefit for eastern individuals:13
λW (t) =
∫ ∞
t
[wW (s)− wE(s)] e−r¯[s−t]ds > 0. (18)
Using (3) and (14), the eastern population size evolves according to
N˙E(t) = −γ−1L λW (t), (19)
Along the transition path, the migration benefit decreases due to migration and capital ac-
cumulation until capital-labor ratios are equalized across regions. In a steady state equilib-
rium it holds that λW = 0, so that population size is constant in both regions as N˙E = 0. For
a given positive migration benefit, higher migration costs imply lower migration rates dur-
ing the transition and a higher eastern population size in the steady state equilibrium.
3.4 Equilibrium and Stability Analysis
An equilibrium of the dynamic small open economy is defined as follows:
Definition 3.1. Suppose the given interest rate r¯ is stationary and equals individual’s time
12 The knife-edge condition of the Open-Economy Ramsey model is extensively discussed e.g. in Barro and
Sala-i Martin (2004, pp. 161).
13 Equation (18) implies perfect foresight since the labor income differential depends on the future amount of
capital installed and labor employed in both regions.
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preference rate ρ. For any set of initial conditions {KE(0),KW (0), NE(0)} a competitive
equilibrium is given by a set of time paths for quantities {KE(t),KW (t), NE(t)}t∈(0,∞) and
prices {qE(t), qW (t), λW (t), wE(t), wW (t)}t∈(0,∞) such that the capital stock in both regions
evolves according to (5) and it holds in any period that
1. firms maximize the present value of net cash flow;
2. individuals maximize life-time utility;
3. if and only if labor is interregionally mobile, migration benefits equal migration costs,
λj(t) = mci, i, j ∈ {E,W}, i 6= j;
4. the labor market clears.
Equilibrium conditions 1, 2, and 4 are straightforward. Condition 3 holds, since mi-
gration costs are a function in the number of migrants, M(t), in period t according to (14).
Using (9), (10), (19) together with Li = Ni, and differentiating (18) with respect to time, the
evolution of the economy is then governed by the following differential equation system:
K˙E =
(
qE − 1
γK
− δ
)
KE , (20)
K˙W =
(
qW − 1
γK
− δ
)
KW , (21)
N˙E = −γ−1L λW , (22)
q˙E = (r¯ + δ) qE − α
(
KE
NE
)α−1
− (qE − 1)
2
2γK
, (23)
q˙W = (r¯ + δ) qW − α
(
KW
P −NE
)α−1
− (qW − 1)
2
2γK
, (24)
λ˙W = r¯λW − (wW − wE) , (25)
KE(0),KW (0), NE(0) are given.
A steady state equilibrium of the system is defined by the constancy of the three state
variables, K˙E = K˙W = N˙E = 0, and costate variables, q˙E = q˙W = λ˙W = 0. Starting with
the costate variables, q¯E = q¯W = 1 + δγK follows directly from (20) and (21), where a bar
denotes steady state values. The migration benefit is constant if and only if wW = wE ,
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which requires identical capital-labor ratios in both regions. Setting q˙E = q˙W = 0 in (23)
and (24) respectively and using the expression for q¯E and q¯W yields
KE
NE
=
KW
P −NE =
(
α
(r¯ + δ)(1 + γKδ)− γKδ22
) 1
1−α
, (26)
where NW = P − NE is used. Thus, (26) implies w¯W = w¯E in steady state and therefore
λ¯W = 0. For a given eastern population size, steady state regional capital endowments are
uniquely determined.
For the stability analysis of the dynamic system, equations (20)-(25) are linearized by
means of a first-order Taylor approximation and written in matrix form:14

q˙E
q˙W
λ˙W
K˙E
K˙W
N˙E

=

r¯ 0 0 −FEKK 0 −FEKL
0 r¯ 0 0 −FWKK −FWKL
0 0 r¯ FELK −FWLK FELL − FWLL
K¯Eγ
−1
K 0 0 0 0 0
0 K¯W γ
−1
K 0 0 0 0
0 0 −γ−1L 0 0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
M

qE − q¯E
qW − q¯W
λE − λ¯W
KE − K¯E
KW − K¯W
NE − N¯E

. (27)
The analytic expression for the six eigenvalues of matrixM are given by15
{λ1, . . . , λ6} =

0, r¯,
1
2
(
r¯ +
√
r¯2 + 2(A−
√
A2 − 4B)
)
,
1
2
(
r¯ +
√
r¯2 + 2(A+
√
A2 − 4B)
)
1
2
(
r¯ −
√
r¯2 + 2(A+
√
A2 − 4B)
)
,
1
2
(
r¯ −
√
r¯2 + 2(A−
√
A2 − 4B)
)

, (28)
where
A = −
[
FEKKK¯Eγ
−1
K + F
W
KKK¯W γ
−1
K + (F
E
LL − FWLL)γ−1L
]
, (29)
B = K¯W γ
−1
K γ
−1
L
[
FWKK
(
FELL − FWLL
)
+
(
FWKL
)2]
+ K¯Eγ
−1
K γ
−1
L
[
FEKK
(
FELL − FWLL
)
−
(
FEKL
)2]
+K¯EK¯W γ
−2
K F
E
KKF
W
KK . (30)
14 F ik,l denotes the second derivative of the production function of region i ∈ {E,W} with respect to k, l ∈
{Ki, Li} to simplify notations. The derivation is provided in the online-appendix.
15 The derivation is relegated to the appendix.
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For non-negative values of the inner discriminant, A2 − 4B, the model implies mean-
ingful solutions. The dynamic system exhibits three strictly positive (λ2, λ3, λ4) and two
strictly negative eigenvalues (λ5, λ6) and corresponds to a perfect foresight model with
saddle-path stability. Moreover, as λ1 = 0 the model exhibits path dependency. There
exists a unique steady state equilibrium corresponding to a given set of initial values for
the endogenous state variables {KE(0),KW (0), NE(0)}. Changes in the initial conditions
will therefore change the steady state capital and labor endowment in both regions. The
model’s speed of convergence is determined by the smallest absolute negative eigenvalue,
λ6, which is increasing in the adjustment cost intensities γL and γK .
3.5 Calibration
α r¯ δ γL γK P
0.3 0.03 0.05 357.08 10.8 5
Table 2: Baseline calibration
The model parameters are specified to meet the empirical regularities of Germany’s
post-unification periods. The technology parameter is set to α = 0.3 to be in line with
empirical estimates on German data (Dreger and Schumacher, 2000; Willman, 2002) and
the rate of return to capital is set to r¯ = 0.03.
The migration cost intensity parameter γL is calibrated as follows.16 Equation (22)
states that γL = λW−N˙E . Using λE(t) = −λW (t), the initial theoretical migration benefit for
an East German resident is expressed by λE(0) =
∫∞
0 [wE(s)− wW (s)] e−r¯sds, where t = 0
corresponds to 1991 in real-time. Assume that the western wage takes on its steady state
value in each period and productivity convergence between East and West Germany takes
place at a constant rate κ. Then, with an initial and steady state value convergence may
be approximated by wE(s)− w¯W ∼= [wE(0)− w¯W ] e−κs for s ≥ 0. Given the time series for
real labor productivity convergence in Table 1, this approximation implies κ ∼= 0.04. For an
initial productivity gap of roughly 60 percent in 1991, the initial theoretical migration ben-
efit reads λE(0) ∼= −8.57. That is, the gain in terms of human wealth for an East German
16 The calibration strategy basically follows Burda (2006).
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worker moving to West Germany in 1991 was roughly 857% of the annual western wage.
Note that the calibration strategy is based on productivity rather than observed wage con-
vergence to get a benchmark prediction of economic integration. Using the latter would
have implied a lower initial migration benefit as wage convergence exceeded productiv-
ity convergence, particularly during the first decade after unification. This empirical fact
is taken into account in both extensions of the model in Section 4 and 5. East Germany’s
labor force accounted for roughly 20 percent of overall Germany in 1991. Thus, the eastern
population share, NE , is normalized to unity and overall population is set to P = 5. In
the same year, about 2.4 percent of the East German labor force migrated to West Germany
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005), so that γL = λW−N˙E
∼= 357.08.
The steady state condition for the shadow price of capital states that γK = q¯−1δ . Dittmann
et al. (2010) estimated q = 1.54 for the average German shadow value of capital. Given
δ = 0.05 for unified Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010, 2011), the capital adjustment
cost intensity reads γK = 10.8.
The baseline set of parameter values are listed in Table 2. The frictions γL and γK
are the key determinants of slowing migration and capital formation, so that capital-labor
ratios across both regions are not equalized instantaneously. To analyse the transitional
dynamics of the endogenous variables, the dynamical system is solved by applying the
relaxation algorithm introduced by Trimborn et al. (2008).17
3.6 Numerical Evaluation
In this section I discuss the transitional dynamics of the endogenous variables and compare
the theoretical predictions of the benchmark model with the empirical results for relative
East-West-German labor productivity convergence, East-German labor force net outmigra-
tion, and East-German private gross capital inflows. I also perform a sensitivity analysis
with respect to variations in migration and capital adjustment cost intensities. The initial
capital endowments in both regions are set in the following way: I assume that West Ger-
many was in steady state equilibrium at the time of unification, so that KW (0) = K¯W .
17 The algorithm is implemented in Mathematica. The underlying file is available from the author upon re-
quest.
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The initial eastern capital endowment, KE(0), is then chosen such that the model matches
initially the 40 percent East German real labor productivity level in 1991.
3.6.1 Transitional Dynamics
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Figure 2: Transitional dynamics implied by the benchmark model. Solid lines: time path
eastern variables; dashed lines: time path western variables. Set of parameters as
in Table 2.
Figure 2 illustrates the time path of the three state and co-state variables, the eastern and
western wage as well as income per capita in both regions. The blue solid lines represent
the path of the eastern and the purple dashed lines of the western variables, respectively.
Starting from initial values at time zero, the dynamic transition sets in at period one.18 The
initial conditions imply: (i) large capital investment incentives in the east (panel d) associ-
ated with capital accumulation over time (panel a), and (ii) positive migration benefits for
eastern individuals (panel f) associated with east-west migration flows (panel c).19 Capital
18 Previous periods on the negative x-axis are associated with the initial value of the respective variable to
highlight the economy’s take off. Periods on the x-axis correspond to years.
19 Note that the initial migration benefit λW (0) deviates from the calibrated value in section 3.5. The devia-
tion results from the assumption of a constant rate of productivity convergence κ to simplify calibration.
However, the model presented is of non-linear form and exhibits a non-constant convergence rate.
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inflows and labor outflows lead to a decline of both, the shadow value of the eastern cap-
ital stock and the migration benefit, during the transition to the steady state equilibrium.
Moreover, east-west migration flows increases capital investment incentives in the west
(panel e) associated with capital accumulation over time (panel b). Migration, therefore,
affects the long run capital endowment in both regions. The benchmark model implies
small repercussion effects of economic integration on western wages (panel g) and west-
ern income per capita (panel h).
3.6.2 Evaluation
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Figure 3: Time paths of labor productivity convergence, gross capital investment rates, and
net migration rates implied by the benchmark model. Set of parameters as in
Table 2.
Figure 3 displays the time paths of labor productivity convergence, gross capital invest-
ment rates, and net migration rates (dotted lines) together with the corresponding empiri-
cal time series (solid lines). Starting at a 40 percent labor productivity level, the benchmark
model implies faster productivity convergence apart from the first eight years (panel a),
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on average more capital inflows (panel b) and less outmigration (panel c) compared to
the observed empirical pattern. More specifically, the model predicts total net migration
between 1991 and 2011 of about 981,300 persons, compared with 1,186,500 East German
migrants over the same period. Thus, the neoclassical model with factor mobility underes-
timates migration and overestimates productivity convergence and gross capital investments
in unified Germany over the observable time period.
As outlined above, the benchmark model exhibits productivity compensation and full
employment in each period. According to Table 1, however, Eastern real wage convergence
predominated productivity convergence, particularly during the early years after unifica-
tion. The high-wage policy increased Eastern firms’ production costs and led to massive
lay-offs and rising unemployment rates. Thus, this aspect of German Reunification moti-
vates the introduction of a wage-setting behavior into the theoretical framework.
3.6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
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Figure 4: Time paths of labor productivity convergence, gross capital investment rates, and
net migration rates, assuming alternative migration cost intensities.
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Migration and capital adjustment cost intensities are the key parameter determining
the model’s dynamics. Therefore, I first consider an increase (decrease) in migration cost
intensity γL by 10 percent. The time path of labor productivity convergence in panel (a) of
Figure 4 parallels the result in Rappaport (2005): a change in labor mobility costs does not
affect the speed of productivity convergence. Capital investment rates are only marginally
affect, whereas migration rates increase (decrease) significantly due to a decrease (increase)
in migration costs.
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Figure 5: Time paths of labor productivity convergence, gross capital investment rates, and
net migration rates, assuming alternative capital adjustment cost intensities.
Figure 5 displays that an increase (decrease) in capital adjustment cost intensity γK by
10 percent, lowers (raises) gross capital investment rates (panel b), which in turn decreases
(increases) labor productivity convergence marginally (panel a). Variations in γK changes
the evolution of migration rates only in a minor way (panel c).
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4 Introducing Wage-Setting Behavior
Consider the benchmark model described above. In the following extension, I assume that
the eastern wage is imposed by the behavioral function w˜E , which exceeds the market
clearing wage outside of a steady state. The eastern employment rate `E is then endoge-
nously determined in accordance with the behavioral function to satisfy marginal produc-
tivity compensation. The western employment rate is normalized to unity and assumed
to be constant for native individuals and immigrants, so that LW = NW and LE = NE`E .
During the transition, wage-setting behavior is accountable for a lower eastern employ-
ment rate (higher unemployment rate) compared to the western region, i.e. `E < 1, which
corresponds to the empirical observation in unified Germany documented in Table 1. The
way wage-setting behavior is introduced here seems plausible in a representative agent
framework since the considered agent represents the average individual of his respective
region.
4.1 Behavioral Function and Migration Benefit
Assume that East Germany’s wage path is a function of its western equivalent, analog to
Funke and Strulik (2000), and takes the form of
w˜E(t) = θ
βwW (t), 0 < β < 1, (31)
where θ = yE/yW denotes the east’s relative labor productivity per worker with yE =
(KE/NE)α`
1−α
E and yW = (KW/(P−NE))
α.20 For example, given an initial 40 percent rela-
tive labor productivity level and β = 0.6, equation (31) implies a relative eastern wage of
58 percent at unification time and 81 percent when θ equals 70 percent.
Marginal productivity compensation requires that w˜E = (1−α)
(
KE
NE`E
)α
holds in each
period t. Substituting the expression into (31) and solving for `E yields the time path of the
20 For a micro-founded analysis of wage-setting behavior in Eastern Germany see e.g. Burda and Funke (1993).
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eastern employment rate:
`E(t) =
 KE(t)NE(t)
KW (t)
P−NE(t)

α−αβ
(1−α)β+α
, (32)
which depends on the relative eastern capital-labor ratio. Initial conditions then imply that
`E < 1 throughout the transition until capital-labor ratios are equalized in steady state, so
that ¯`E = θ¯ = 1 and w˜E = wW . Using (32), the eastern wage is given by
w˜E(t) = (1− α)
(
KE(t)
NE(t)
) αβ
(1−α)β+α
(
KW (t)
P −NE(t)
) α(α−αβ)
(1−α)β+α
. (33)
Thus, eastern labor income is now represented by the wage sum w˜E`E given by (32) and
(33) respectively, whereas western labor income, wW , remains unchanged,
Using the wage sum in the optimization problem of the representative eastern individ-
ual in (11) and (12) yields the optimal consumption path:
cE(t) =

ρ
(
aE(t) +
∫ ∞
t
e−r¯[s−t]w˜E(s)`E(s)ds
)
if the agent does not migrate
ρ
(
aE(t) +
∫ ∞
t
e−r¯[s−t]wW (s)ds−mcE
)
if the agent migrates in period t
. (34)
The migration benefit given by the present value labor income differential across both re-
gions, λW (t) =
∫∞
t [wW (s)− w˜E(s)`E(s)] e−r¯[s−t]ds, now evolves according to
λ˙W (t) = r¯λW (t)− [wW (t)− w˜E(t)`E(t)] . (35)
4.2 Equilibrium and Stability Analysis
An equilibrium of the dynamic small open economy with wage-setting behavior is defined
as follows:
Definition 4.1. Consider the benchmark model described in Section 3 extended by wage-
setting behavior according to (31). Suppose the given interest rate r¯ is stationary and equals
individual’s time preference rate ρ. For any set of initial conditions {KE(0),KW (0), NE(0)}
a competitive equilibrium is given by a set of time paths for quantities {KE(t),KW (t),
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NE(t)}t∈(0,∞), prices {qE(t), qW (t), λW (t), w˜E(t), wW (t)}t∈(0,∞), and value {`E(t)}t∈(0,∞)
such that the capital stock in both regions evolves according to (5) and it holds in any
period that
1. firms maximize the present value of net cash flow;
2. individuals maximize life-time utility;
3. if and only if labor is interregionally mobile, migration benefits equal migration costs,
λj(t) = mci, i, j ∈ {E,W}, i 6= j;
4. the labor market clears.
The dynamic system of the extended model is described by (20)-(22), (24), (35) to-
gether with q˙E = (r¯ + δ) qE − α
(
KE
NE`E
)α−1 − (qE−1)22γK and KE(0),KW (0), NE(0) given. For
¯`
E = θ¯ = 1 and w˜E = w¯W in steady state equilibrium, the local stability properties of the
extended model are identical to the benchmark model as discussed in Section 3.4. How-
ever, wage-setting behavior affects the transitional dynamics of the endogenous variables
and the steady state distribution of production factors in both regions.
4.3 Calibration
α r¯ δ γL γK P β
0.3 0.03 0.05 291.67 10.8 5 0.82
Table 3: Calibration of the model with wage-setting behavior
The baseline calibration in Table 2 remains unchanged except for two parameter val-
ues. First, the concavity parameter β of the behavioral function in (31) is specified to be
consistent with the German Reunification period. Therefore, dividing both sides of (31) by
the western wage at time t and using the average East German relative real wage and real
labor productivity level from Table 1 to get β ∼= 0.82. Average values are chosen, so that
w˜E traces on average the observed time path of East-West real wage convergence between
1991 and 2011.
Second, the migration cost intensity γL is adjusted. The initial theoretical migration
benefit for an East German household now reads λE(0) =
∫∞
0 [w˜E(s)`E(s)− w¯W ] e−r¯sds.
22
Thus, labor income convergence may be approximated by the time series of real wage con-
vergence in Table 1, which implies a constant convergence rate of κ ∼= 0.03. For a real
wage gap of 42 percent in 1991, the initial theoretical migration benefit and the migration
cost intensity read λE(0) ∼= −7 and γL ∼= 291.67, respectively. Note that, using real wage
convergence instead of labor productivity convergence implies a lower initial migration
benefit and therefore a lower migration cost intensity. All parameter values are summa-
rized in Table 3.
4.4 Numerical Evaluation
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Figure 6: Time paths of labor productivity convergence, gross capital investment rates, and
net migration rates implied by the model with wage-setting behavior. Set of pa-
rameters as in Table 3.
As displayed by the dashed lines in Figure 6, wage setting slows down labor produc-
tivity convergence marginally but increases net migration significantly compared to the
benchmark model. Aggregate migration increases from 981,300 (benchmark model) to
1,317,600 persons (compared with 1,186,500 East German migrants) over the observable
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time period. That is, wage-setting behavior lowers the eastern employment rate and de-
presses labor income.21 Depressed income in turn causes more labor to migrate to the west
in each period (panel c). Moreover, the lower employment rate leads to a fall in regional
GDP and depresses capital investment incentives which keeps the gross capital investment
rate nearly unchanged (panel b). Even though the quantitative effect is rather small, less
capital investments, however, delay labor productivity convergence between both inte-
grated regions (panel a).
Massive lay-offs and rising east-west migration rates as a consequence of the high-wage
policy required the German government to substantially increase social security transfers
to East German households. In a final step, this aspect of Reunification motivates the in-
troduction of a public transfer system into the existing framework and to evaluate the
predictions of the further extended model.
5 Introducing Public Social Transfers
Consider the model with wage-setting behavior described in Section 4. In the following
extension, I assume that eastern individuals exclusively enjoy public transfers zE to com-
pensate for their loss of labor income due to lower employment rates during the transition
to the steady state. These transfers then reflect parts of the enhanced social security pay-
ments to East German households in the aftermath of unification.
5.1 Model Modifications
To finance transfers, assume that the government taxes capital and labor income in both
regions with an identical but time-varying tax rate τ . The government runs a balanced
budget according to
τ(t) [YW (t) + YE(t)] = ZE(t), (36)
where ZE = zENE denotes aggregate government spendings. Eastern individuals receive
transfers of zE = (1− `E) w˜E to compensate for their loss of labor income due to non-
21 In the appendix (Fig. B.1-B.2) the transitional dynamics implied by both extended models are displayed.
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employment (1− `E). Multiplying both sides by the eastern population size at time t and
substituting into (36) yields the time path of the tax rate:
τ(t) =
[w˜E(t)− `E(t)w˜E(t)]NE(t)
YW (t) + YE(t)
, (37)
where `E and w˜E are given by (32) and (33) respectively. During the transition to the
steady state, the tax rate is positive as `E < 1 and converges to zero as the employment
rate converges to unity.
The representative firm in each region now chooses paths for investment Ii and labor
Li, so as to maximize the present value of its after-tax net cash flow:
max
Li,Ii
∫ ∞
0
{
(1− τ) [Kαi L1−αi − wiLi]− Ii [1 + γK2
(
Ii
Ki
)]}
e−r¯tdt (38)
s.t. (7), i = E,W,
where capital adjustment costs are not deductible and initial conditions are given. The
evolution of the capital stock in both regions is then governed by
K˙i =
(
qi − 1
γK
− δ
)
Ki, (39)
q˙i = (r¯ + δ) qi − (1− τ)α
(
Ki
Ni`i
)α−1
− (qi − 1)
2
2γK
, (40)
where Li = Ni`i and i = E,W . A positive tax rate reduces capital investment incentives
and the rate of capital accumulation in both regions. The western wage remains given by
(8), while the eastern wage is affected by wage-setting behavior and evolves according to
(33).
Human wealth of an eastern individual is now comprised by after-tax labor income,
(1−τ)w˜E`E , and public transfers, (1−`E)w˜E . More specifically, individual wealth reads
VE(t) =

aE(t) +
∫ ∞
t
e−r¯[s−t] [1− τ(s)`E(s)] w˜E(s)ds if agent does not migrate
aE(t) +
∫ ∞
t
e−r¯[s−t] [1− τ(s)]wW (s)ds−mcE if agent migrates in t
. (41)
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Using the adjusted individual wealth (41) in the optimization problem of the representative
eastern individual in (11) and (12) yields the optimal consumption path of a migrant and
non-migrant differing by the present value labor income differential across both regions.
Again, this difference determines the migration benefit, which now evolves according to
λ˙W (t) = r¯λW (t)− {[1− τ(t)]wW (t)− [1− τ(t)`E(t)] w˜E(t)} . (42)
5.2 Equilibrium and Stability Analysis
An equilibrium of the dynamic small open economy with wage-setting behavior and tax-
financed public transfers is defined as follows:
Definition 5.1. Consider the model described in Section 4 extended by a public transfer
system described by (36) and (37). Suppose the given interest rate r¯ is stationary and equals
individual’s time preference rate ρ. For any set of initial conditions {KE(0),KW (0), NE(0)}
a competitive equilibrium is given by a set of time paths for quantities {KE(t),KW (t),
NE(t)}t∈(0,∞), prices {qE(t), qW (t), λW (t), w˜E(t), wW (t)}t∈(0,∞), and values {`E(t), τ(t),
zE(t)}t∈(0,∞) such that the capital stock in both regions evolves according to (5) and it
holds in any period that
1. firms maximize the present value of net cash flow;
2. individuals maximize life-time utility;
3. if and only if labor is interregionally mobile, migration benefits equal migration costs,
λj(t) = mci, i, j ∈ {E,W}, i 6= j;
4. the labor market clears;
5. the governments budget is balanced according to (36).
The dynamic system of the fully extended model is described by (19), (39), (40), and
(42). The local stability properties of the extended model are again identical to the bench-
mark model as τ¯ = z¯E = 0 and w˜E = w¯W in steady state. However, public transfers affect
the transitional dynamics of the endogenous variables and the steady state distribution of
production factors in both regions.
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5.3 Numerical Evaluation
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Figure 7: Time paths of labor productivity convergence, gross capital investment rates, and
net migration rates implied by the model with wage-setting behavior and public
social transfers. Set of parameters as in Table 3.
Compensating eastern individuals for their labor income loss due to wage setting re-
quires a tax rate of about 1.2 percent initially (see panel d of Figure B.2 in the appendix).
Tax rate and transfers decrease over time as capital-labor ratios are equalized across both
regions. Then, as displayed by the solid (red) lines in Figure 7, public transfers mitigate
the effect of wage setting on net migration, the time path moves closer to the observable
migration pattern (panel c), whereas the implied labor productivity path (panel a) and the
implied gross capital inflow path (panel b) do not change significantly. More generous
public transfers would lower net migration rates further, but would also require a higher
tax rate that may distorts capital investments and delays labor productivity convergence
more strongly. The fully extended model, however, predicts total net migration between
1991 and 2011 of about 1,110,900 persons, compared with 1,186,500 East German migrants
over the same period. Thus, the model matches the aggregate migration pattern in unified
27
Germany successfully.
6 Summary and Conclusion
The massive movement of capital and labor in opposite directions is the most striking
characteristic of economic integration of Eastern and Western Germany. Thus, the first
aim of this paper was to evaluate the potential of a neoclassical growth model with capital
and labor mobility to explain major empirical trends of the German integration episode.
I therefore set up a benchmark model and compared it’s predictions with the empirical
time series for relative East-West-German labor productivity convergence, East-German
labor force net outmigration, and East-German private gross capital inflows. As a result,
the model implies faster productivity convergence (apart from the first eight years), lower
emigration and less capital inflows than observed in unified Germany.
The second aim was then to examine the impact of wage-setting behavior and public so-
cial transfers, two policy measures that have been actually implemented, on the macroeco-
nomic development in unified Germany. I first introduced wage-setting behavior into the
framework, which, as a result, increased annual net migration rates significantly, slowed
down labor productivity convergence marginally, and changed gross capital inflows in a
minor way. In a second step, I extended the model by public social transfers in favor of
eastern workers. As a result, net migration rates are lowered, whereas implied labor pro-
ductivity convergence and gross capital inflows did not change significantly.
In summary, I show that the fully extended model is able to replicate aggregate migra-
tion pattern in unified Germany. Furthermore, wage-setting behavior has delayed labor
productivity convergence between both German regions and would have increased East-
West net migration substantially if government interventions had not been carried out.
Finally, public social transfers have been successful in reducing the effect of wage setting
on East-West net migration.
The paper complements the theoretical literature on the pattern of German East-West
convergence by including a key feature, namely migration, into the analysis. The proposed
model therefore provides a tractable analytical framework for future research studying
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public policy effects on capital and labor mobility in the process of economic integration.
A Appendix: Derivations
The Firm’s Maximization Problem
The current-value Hamiltonian corresponding to the optimization problem of a firm of
region i (see Definition 3.1) is given by
Hi = Kαi L1−αi − wiLi − Ii
[
1 +
γK
2
(
Ii
Ki
)]
+ qi (Ii − δKi) .
where qi is the multiplier (co-state-variable) associated with constraint (7). Necessary op-
timality conditions are ∂Hi/∂Li = 0, ∂Hi/∂Ii = 0, q˙i = r¯qi − ∂Hi/∂Ki, and the corresponding
transversality condition. Thus,
wi = (1− α)
(
Ki
Li
)α
, (43)
Ii
Ki
=
qi − 1
γK
, (44)
q˙i = (r¯ + δ) qi − α
(
Ki
Li
)α−1
− γK
2
(
Ii
Ki
)2
(45)
lim
t→∞ e
−r¯tqitKit = 0. (46)
Substituting (44) into (5) and (45) yields (9) and (10).
Eigenvalues of MatrixM
Note thatM is a 2 × 2 block matrix with four 3 × 3 matrices. Since both matrices on the
diagonal ofM are diagonal in itself the eigenvalues ofM can be calculated analytically in
a simple straight forward way. Let F denote the quadratic upper right matrix and C the
quadratic lower left matrix ofM, so that
M =
 r¯I F
C 0I
 ,
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where I denotes the identity matrix. The matrix eigenvalues are given by the solution of
the characteristic polynomial ρM(λ) = det(M− λI) = 0 with
M− λI =
 (r¯ − λ)I F
C −λI
 .
Since the diagonal ofM is given by two diagonal matrices the characteristic polynomial
ρM(λ) simplifies to ρM(λ) = −det (FC + (r¯ − λ)λI) = 0, implying the two roots λ1 and
λ2. Let −ϕ be the solution to (r¯ − λ)λ such that
λ1,2 =
1
2
(
r¯ ±
√
r¯2 + 4ϕ
)
. (47)
Then, computation further simplifies to the solution of the characteristic polynomial of the
3× 3 matrix FC:
ρFC(ϕ) = −det (FC − ϕI) = 0, (48)
where
FC =

−FEKKK¯Eγ−1K 0 FEKLγ−1L
0 −FWKKK¯Wγ−1K FWKLγ−1L
FELKK¯Eγ
−1
K −FWLKK¯Wγ−1K −(FELL − FWLL)γ−1L
 .
F ijk denotes the second derivative of the production function of region i = {E,W} with
respect to j, k ∈ {Ki, Li}. The solution to (48) yields the three roots ϕ1, ϕ2, and ϕ3 and is
given by ρFC(ϕ) = det(F) det(C)−Bϕ+Aϕ2 − ϕ3 = 0, where
A := tr(FC) > 0,
B := [det(FC11) + det(FC22) + det(FC33)] > 0,
and det(FCii) is the minor of FC formed by eliminating row i and column i.22 Note that
22 The elements of F exhibit the following properties: F iKL = F iLK > 0 and F iKK < 0, i = E,W as well as
FWLL > 0 and F
E
LL < 0.
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the determinant of F is zero for a Cobb-Douglas production function, so the solution to
(48) reduces to ρFC(ϕ) = ϕ
(
ϕ2 −Aϕ+B) = 0 and is solved by
ϕ1 = 0 (49)
ϕ2,3 =
1
2
(
A±
√
A2 − 4B
)
. (50)
Substituting (49) and (50) into (47) yields the six eigenvalues of matrixM.
B Appendix: Trajectories
• Figure B.1 displays the trajectories of the endogenous variables implied by the model
with wage-setting behavior discussed in Section 4.
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Figure B.1: Transitional dynamics implied by the model with wage-setting behavior. Solid
lines: time path eastern variables; dashed lines: time path western variables.
Set of parameters as in Table 3.
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• Figure B.2 displays the trajectories of the endogenous variables implied by the model
with wage-setting behavior and public social transfers discussed in Section 5.
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Figure B.2: Transitional dynamics implied by the model with wage-setting behavior and
public social transfers. Solid lines: time path eastern variables; dashed lines:
time path western variables; dotted line: time path tax rate. Set of parameters
as in Table 3.
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Online-Appendix
Here I provide the derivations of the linearized dynamic system applied in the stability
analysis in Section 3.4. The first-order Taylor approximation of (20) and (21) yields
K˙i = K¯iγ
−1
K (qi − q¯i) +
[
q¯i − 1
γK
− δ
] (
Ki − K¯i
)
, i = E,W.
Using q¯E = q¯W = 1 + δγK one gets
K˙E = K¯Eγ
−1
K (qE − q¯E) , (51)
K˙W = K¯Wγ
−1
K (qW − q¯W ) . (52)
Linearizing the evolution of the eastern population size in (22) yields
N˙E = −γ−1L
(
λW − λ¯W
)
. (53)
Linearizing (23) and (24) yields
q˙E = r¯ (qE − q¯E)− FEKK
(
KE − K¯E
)− FEKL (LE − L¯E) , (54)
q˙W = r¯ (qW − q¯W )− FWKK
(
KW − K¯W
)− FWKL (LE − L¯E) , (55)
where q¯E = q¯W = 1 + δγK is used and F ijk is the second derivative of the production
function of region i = {E,W} with respect to j, k = {Ki, Li}. The second derivatives
explicitly read
FEKK = α(α− 1)Kα−2E L1−αE < 0, FEKL = α(1− α)Kα−1E L−αE > 0,
FWKK = α(α− 1)Kα−2W (P − LE)1−α < 0, FWKL = −α(1− α)Kα−1W (P − LE)−α < 0.
Linearizing the evolution of the migration benefit in (25) yields
λ˙W = r¯
(
λW − λ¯W
)
+ FELK
(
KE − K¯E
)− FWLK(KW − K¯W )− (FWLL − FELL) (LE − L¯E) , (56)
36
where
FELK = α(1− α)Kα−1E L−αE > 0, FELL = −α(1− α)KαEL−α−1E < 0,
FWLK = α(1− α)Kα−1W (P − LE)−α > 0, FWLL = α(1− α)KαW (P − LE)−α−1 > 0.
The linearized dynamic system is defined by equations (51)-(56).
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